Los Principios Wates de Gobierno Corporativo para Grandes Empresas Privadas

Surgieron tras un intenso debate sobre la responsabilidad de las Grandes Empresas Privadas hacia los stakeholders y la sociedad. Responden a la necesidad de establecer unas normas mínimas más estrictas par el gobierno corporativo y la presentación de informes de las Grandes Empresas Privadas

A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artifcial Moral Agents (AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specifc ethical school. The former appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for AMAs, and the latter opts for “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning to provide “the essential groundwork for making an all things considered judgment regarding the moral case for building AMAs” (Formosa and Ryan 2019, pp. 1–2). Although this strategy may beneft their acceptability, it may also detract from their ethical rootedness, coherence, and persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated ethical traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed by a distinctive philosophical anthropology and worldview, is summoned to fll this gap as a standard to test these two opposing claims. It provides a substantive account of moral agency through the theory of voluntary action; it explains how voluntary action is tied to intelligent and autonomous human life; and it distinguishes machine operations from voluntary actions through the categories of poiesis and praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while Van Wynsberghe and Robbins may be right in rejecting the need for AMAs, there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing with Formosa and Ryan’s defense of AMAs, their call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach, similar to neo-Aristotelian practical wisdom, becomes expedient

Algunas consideraciones sobre el derecho al libre comercio en la doctrina de Francisco de Vitoria

In Francisco de Vitoria’s relections De Indis and De iure belli, free trade is presented as a “human right” in accordance with ius gentium. This right is rooted in the right of communication and association. The rights to travel, dwell and emigrate precede it and it is also closely related to the rights to preach, to protect converts and to constitute Christian princes. It is argued how the right to free trade has as its ultimate foundation on natural law and indirectly on divine law; trade is not independent of ethics; and it allows for the development of justice and friendship, among other repercussions. Francisco de Vitoria is presented as a defender of private initiative and the free market.En las relecciones De Indis y De iure belli de Francisco de Vitoria, el libre comercio se presenta como un “derecho humano” de acuerdo con el ius gentium. Este derecho está enraizado en el derecho de comunicación y asociación. Los derechos a viajar, morar y emigrar lo preceden y también está estrechamente relacionado con los derechos a predicar, proteger a los conversos y constituir príncipes cristianos. En el presente trabajo se defiende que el derecho al libre comercio tiene como último fundamento la ley natural e, indirectamente, la ley divina; que el comercio no es independiente de la ética; y que permite desarrollar la justicia y la amistad, entre otras repercusiones. Francisco de Vitoria se presenta como defensor de la iniciativa privada y del libre mercado

Los Principios Wates de Gobierno Corporativo para Grandes Empresas Privadas

Surgieron tras un intenso debate sobre la responsabilidad de las Grandes Empresas Privadas hacia los stakeholders y la sociedad. Responden a la necesidad de establecer unas normas mínimas más estrictas par el gobierno corporativo y la presentación de informes de las Grandes Empresas Privadas

Algunas consideraciones sobre el derecho al libre comercio en la doctrina de Francisco de Vitoria

In Francisco de Vitoria’s relections De Indis and De iure belli, free trade is presented as a “human right” in accordance with ius gentium. This right is rooted in the right of communication and association. The rights to travel, dwell and emigrate precede it and it is also closely related to the rights to preach, to protect converts and to constitute Christian princes. It is argued how the right to free trade has as its ultimate foundation on natural law and indirectly on divine law; trade is not independent of ethics; and it allows for the development of justice and friendship, among other repercussions. Francisco de Vitoria is presented as a defender of private initiative and the free market.En las relecciones De Indis y De iure belli de Francisco de Vitoria, el libre comercio se presenta como un “derecho humano” de acuerdo con el ius gentium. Este derecho está enraizado en el derecho de comunicación y asociación. Los derechos a viajar, morar y emigrar lo preceden y también está estrechamente relacionado con los derechos a predicar, proteger a los conversos y constituir príncipes cristianos. En el presente trabajo se defiende que el derecho al libre comercio tiene como último fundamento la ley natural e, indirectamente, la ley divina; que el comercio no es independiente de la ética; y que permite desarrollar la justicia y la amistad, entre otras repercusiones. Francisco de Vitoria se presenta como defensor de la iniciativa privada y del libre mercado

A neo-aristotelian perspective on the need for artificial moral agents (AMAs)

We examine Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) critique of the need for Artifcial Moral Agents (AMAs) and its rebuttal by Formosa and Ryan (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) set against a neo-Aristotelian ethical background. Neither Van Wynsberghe and Robbins (JAMA 25:719-735, 2019) essay nor Formosa and Ryan’s (JAMA 10.1007/s00146-020-01089-6, 2020) is explicitly framed within the teachings of a specifc ethical school. The former appeals to the lack of “both empirical and intuitive support” (Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 2019, p. 721) for AMAs, and the latter opts for “argumentative breadth over depth”, meaning to provide “the essential groundwork for making an all things considered judgment regarding the moral case for building AMAs” (Formosa and Ryan 2019, pp. 1–2). Although this strategy may beneft their acceptability, it may also detract from their ethical rootedness, coherence, and persuasiveness, characteristics often associated with consolidated ethical traditions. Neo-Aristotelian ethics, backed by a distinctive philosophical anthropology and worldview, is summoned to fll this gap as a standard to test these two opposing claims. It provides a substantive account of moral agency through the theory of voluntary action; it explains how voluntary action is tied to intelligent and autonomous human life; and it distinguishes machine operations from voluntary actions through the categories of poiesis and praxis respectively. This standpoint reveals that while Van Wynsberghe and Robbins may be right in rejecting the need for AMAs, there are deeper, more fundamental reasons. In addition, despite disagreeing with Formosa and Ryan’s defense of AMAs, their call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach, similar to neo-Aristotelian practical wisdom, becomes expedient